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CASE NOTE
TORTS—Damage Control? Unraveling the New Due Process Standard Prohibiting the Use of Nonparty Harm to Calculate Punitive Damages, Philip
Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007).
Maren P. Schroeder*

INTRODUCTION
Jesse Williams, a long-time smoker, preferred Marlboro cigarettes, manufactured by Philip Morris.1 Upon his death, caused by smoking, his widow brought
a lawsuit against Philip Morris for negligence and deceit.2 At trial, the jury found
her husband smoked, in part, because Philip Morris knowingly and falsely led him
to believe smoking was safe.3 The jury also found both Williams and Philip Morris
equally negligent, and further determined Philip Morris engaged in deceit.4 The
jury awarded $821,000 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive
damages for the deceit claim.5 The trial judge found the punitive damages award
excessive and reduced the award to $32 million.6
Both Philip Morris and Williams appealed the district court’s ruling.7 Upon
appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals restored the $79.5 million jury award.8 The
Oregon Supreme Court then denied review.9 Following this denial, Philip Morris
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.10 The Supreme Court granted
* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2009. I want to recognize the following people
who made this note possible. First, I would like to thank Professor John M. Burman for his guidance
and insight. Additionally, I would like to thank the members of the Wyoming Law Review editorial
board for their time and encouragement. Any errors belong solely to me. I further express my
gratitude to Edward T. Schroeder for his always timely and ever sage advice. I also thank Turner W.
Branch for giving me such a wonderful introduction to the ﬁeld. Finally, I want thank my family,
including my parents Greg and Mary Ann Foster for their support and encouragement. And I
dedicate this case note to my husband, Derek, thank you for your valuable insight and patience.
Thank you all, I am forever in your debt.
1

Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1060-61 (2007).

2

Id. at 1060.

3

Id. at 1061.

4

Id.; Williams v. Philip Morris, 48 P.3d 824, 828 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). The jury found Williams
ﬁfty percent negligent, and therefore, did not award punitive damages on the negligence claim. Id.
5
Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1061. The jury awarded compensatory damages of $21,000 for
economic harm and $800,000 for noneconomic harm. Id.
6

Id.

7

Id.

8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1061.
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certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case back to the Oregon Court
of Appeals.11 Upon remand, the Oregon Court of Appeals refused to reduce the
award.12 Philip Morris, once again, appealed to the Oregon Supreme Court.13
The Oregon Supreme Court granted review and rejected Philip Morris’s
argument that the Constitution prohibits punishing a defendant with punitive
damages based on nonparty harm.14 The court, considering Philip Morris’s
reprehensible conduct, did not ﬁnd the award grossly excessive.15 Following this
ruling, Philip Morris, once again, sought certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court claiming Oregon courts violated the Constitution by allowing punishment for harm suffered by nonparty victims.16 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide “whether the Constitution’s Due Process Clause
permits a jury to base [an] award in part upon its desire to punish the defendant
for harming person’s who are not before the court (e.g., victims whom the parties
do not represent).”17
In a ﬁve-to-four decision, the United States Supreme Court held the
Constitution’s Due Process Clause prohibits a jury from using an award to punish
the defendant for harming persons not before the court.18 According to the
Court, using an award to punish a defendant for such harm constitutes a taking
of “property” without due process of law.19
This case note provides a case-law background regarding punitive damages,
which provides a framework for understanding the Court’s reasoning and the
multiple Philip Morris dissents.20 The note argues the Court draws a confusing
line between using nonparty harm to make reprehensibility determinations and
to punish defendants directly.21 Despite this confusing new standard, this case

11
Id.; Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Williams, 540 U.S. 801 (2003) (remanding in light of
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, Co. v. Campbell); see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (holding there is no mathematical formula for punitive awards, but
few awards with larger than a single-digit ratio between the compensatory and punitive awards will
satisfy due process).
12

Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1061.

13

Id.

14

Id. at 1061-62; Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1175 (Or. 2006).

15

Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1062; Williams, 127 P.3d at 1181-82 (stating Philip Morris
continually schemed to defrauded the smoking public, concealing known health risks of smoking,
which ultimately killed a number of smokers in Oregon).
16

Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1062.

17

Id. at 1060.

18

Id. at 1060, 1062.

19

Id. at 1062.

20

See infra notes 23-115 and accompanying text.

21

See infra notes 119-149 and accompanying text.
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note guides both courts and practitioners in avoiding Due Process Clause
violations in punitive damages cases.22

BACKGROUND
“Punitive damages have long been a part of traditional state tort law.”23 They
serve the purposes of retribution and deterrence.24 Punitive damages are generally
awarded for a defendant’s outrageous conduct, based on the defendant’s evil motive
or reckless indifference.25 In this case note, nonparty harm refers to harm suffered
by strangers to the litigation.26 The following United States Supreme Court,
federal, and Wyoming cases detail the long tradition of punitive damages.
Early case law indicates the foundation of punitive damages in the common
law. In 1851 the United States Supreme Court observed that punitive damages
were well-established in the common law.27 The Day v. Woodworth, et al. Court
stated a jury should measure punitive damages in relation to the magnitude of
the offense, rather than in compensation to the plaintiff.28 The Court found
the “malice, wantonness, oppression or outrage of the defendant’s conduct”
necessary for punitive damages.29 It also described the punitive damage award as
a punishment, which is made payable to the plaintiff.30 The Supreme Court and
most states consider the doctrine of punitive damages settled law.31

The Court Rejects Use of Mathematic Formula
More recently, the Court addressed whether punitive damages calculation
requires the use of a mathematical formula.32 In Paciﬁc Mutual Life Insurance Co.

22

See infra notes 150-168 and accompanying text.

23

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255 (1984).

24

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003).

25

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979).

26

Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007).

27

Day v. Woodworth et al., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851) (noting “repeated judicial
decisions for more than a century” are evidence of well-established nature of exemplary or punitive
damages). Day involved a claim of a downstream milldam owner whose dam had been taken down
by an upstream mill owner. Id. at 363-64.
28

Id. at 371.

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 35 (1983).

32

Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991). Haslip involved a fraud claim
against an insurer and agent for the misappropriation of health insurance premium payments,
which resulted in a canceled policy without notice to four insureds. Id. at 4-5, 18.
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v. Haslip the Court declined to institute a mathematical line separating acceptable
and unacceptable punitive damage awards, under the Due Process Clause.33
The Court stated the Constitution requires inquiry into the reasonableness
and adequacy of jury guidance.34 The Court conceded, however, that unlimited
jury discretion in awarding punitive damages leads to extreme and unconstitutional results.35
Ultimately, the Court concluded the lower court’s criteria for determining
punitive damage awards were reasonably related to the State’s deterrence and
retribution goals, and sufﬁciently constrained the trial court’s damage award.36
The seven criteria used to assess the excessiveness or inadequate nature of an award
included 1) whether a reasonable relationship exists between the punitive damages
award and actual harm or potential harm resulting from the defendant’s conduct,
2) the reprehensibility and length of the defendant’s conduct, the defendant’s
knowledge, any concealment, and the existence and frequency of similar past
conduct, 3) the defendant’s proﬁtability resulting from his conduct, and whether
proﬁt should be removed to give the defendant a loss, 4) the defendant’s wealth,
5) all costs of litigation, 6) mitigation by any criminal sanctions imposed, and
7) mitigation by other civil awards against the defendant for the same conduct.37
Ultimately, the Court upheld a punitive damages award more than four times the
compensatory damage amount, and two-hundred times more than the plaintiff ’s
out-of-pocket expenses.38
Two years later in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., the Court
again declined to use a mathematical formula to uphold a large punitive damages
award despite small compensatory damages.39 In refusing to issue a mathematical test, the Court stated: “It is appropriate to consider the magnitude of the
potential harm that the defendant’s conduct would have caused to its intended victim
. . . as well as the possible harm to other victims that might have resulted if similar

33

Id. at 18.

34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Id. at 21-22.

37

Haslip, 499 U.S. at 21-22 (citing Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223-24 (Ala.
1989)) (emphasis added). But see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell 538 U.S. 408, 423
(“Due process does not permit courts, in the calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the
merits of other parties’ hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise of the reprehensibility
analysis.”) (emphasis added).
38

Haslip, 499 U.S. at 24. The jury rendered a general verdict in favor of Haslip in the amount
of $1,040,000—it is believed that $200,000 of the award was compensatory (including $4,000 of
plaintiff ’s out of pocket expenses), and that at least $840,000 was punitive. Id. at 6 n.2.
39

TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1993) (concerning slander
of title of oil and gas rights). In this case, a jury awarded $19,000 in compensatory damages and $10
million in punitive damages. Id. at 451.
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future behavior was not deterred.”40 The Court did not ﬁnd the dramatic difference
between the compensatory damages and punitive damages controlling.41 Instead,
the Court considered the potential amount of money involved, the defendant’s
bad faith, the defendant’s greater pattern of fraud, and the defendant’s wealth.42
The Court concluded the factor of “alleged wrongdoing in other parts of the
country” was an appropriate factor in determining punitive damages.43

Judicial Review Required by the Due Process Clause
After rejecting a bright line rule for calculating punitive damages in relation to
compensatory damages, the Court speciﬁcally held the absence of judicial review
of punitive damage awards violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.44 The Court noted judicial review has historically safeguarded
against excessive punitive damage awards.45 The Court held punishment, with
exemplary damages, is an act of state power that must comply with the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.46

Notice Requirements Satisfying the Due Process Clause
The Court next required a defendant be given notice of the conduct that will
lead to punitive damages and the potential severity of the award.47 In BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore, Gore unknowingly purchased a repainted car, after
the vehicle sustained damage prior to its delivery to the dealership.48 The jury
awarded $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages
at trial.49 The Alabama Supreme Court reduced the award to $2 million, after

40

Id. at 460.

41

Id. at 462.

42

Id.

43

Id. at 462 n.28.

44

Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994). The Oregon Constitutional
amendment prohibited judicial review of a punitive damages award, unless no evidence existed to
support the verdict. Id. at 418; OR. CONST. ART. VII, § 3. In Oberg, a product liability case, the
plaintiff suffered permanent injuries when he overturned an all-terrain vehicle manufactured and
sold by Honda Motor Co.. Oberg, 512 U.S. at 418. The Court held the Oregon Constitutional
amendment denying judicial review violated the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, and
arbitrarily deprived the defendant of its property without due process of law. Id. at 430, 432, 435.
The Court reversed and remanded the case. Id. at 435.
45

Oberg, 512 U.S. at 421 (stating judicial review of punitive damage awards has been a
“safeguard against excessive verdicts as long as punitive damages have been awarded”).
46

Id. at 434-35.

47

BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996).

48

Id. at 563.

49

Id. at 565.
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determining the jury inappropriately multiplied the compensatory award by the
number of similar sales outside of the state.50
In Gore, the Court noted that laws and policies protecting citizens from
deceptive trade practices vary widely among states.51 As a result, the Gore Court
held no state could impose its own policy on the entire nation or neighboring
states.52 Speciﬁcally, a state could not punish a company for its lawful conduct in
other states.53 Nevertheless, the Court allowed the use of the defendant’s out-ofstate conduct to determine the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.54
The Gore Court also held that under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment a person must have notice of both the type of conduct that is
punishable and the potential severity of that punishment.55 In determining that
BMW had not received the requisite notice, the Court used three guideposts:
1) reprehensibility of conduct; 2) disparity between harm (or potential harm)
suffered and the punitive damages award; and 3) the difference between the
punitive damage award and other civil penalties imposed or awarded in similar
cases.56
In assessing reprehensibility, the Gore Court found the plaintiff suffered only
economic harm, and that the defendant did not show indifference or reckless
disregard for the health and safety of others.57 The Court concluded BMW’s
conduct, while sufﬁcient to warrant tort liability and modest punitive damages,
did not warrant a $2 million punitive award.58 The Court held Alabama could
not justify its sanction imposed on BMW without considering whether a less drastic remedy would achieve its goal.59

Deprivation of Property
The Court upheld the Gore guideposts and asserted that high punitive damage ratios may not comport with the Due Process Clause in State Farm Mutual
Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell.60 In Campbell, the Court found a $145 million

50

Id. at 567.

51

Id. at 569-70.

52

Gore, 517 U.S. at 571.

53

Id. at 572.

54

Id. at 574 n.21.

55

Id. at 574.

56

Id. at 574-75.

57

Gore, 517 U.S. at 576.

58

Id. at 580.

59

Id. at 584.

60

State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003).
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punitive damages award an irrational and arbitrary deprivation of property since
the compensatory damage totaled only $1 million.61
In Campbell, the United States Supreme Court held the punitive damages
award served no legitimate purpose, was grossly excessive, and constituted an
arbitrary deprivation of property.62 Addressing the use of alleged nonparty harm,
the Court stated a jury may not base punitive damages on a defendant’s dissimilar
and unrelated acts.63 The Court found the Utah Supreme Court violated the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause when it adjudicated nonparties’
hypothetical claims in its reprehensibility analysis.64 Because the judgment does not
bind nonparties, the Court warned that such punitive damage calculations could
lead to multiple awards against a defendant for a single course of conduct.65
Discussing the excessive nature of awards, the Campbell Court also asserted a
single-digit ratio between the compensatory and punitive damages awards would
usually comport with Due Process requirements.66 Nevertheless, it refused to
institute a maximum bright-line ratio for punitive damages.67

61
Id. at 412, 429. The Campbells ﬁled suit against State Farm because the company failed to
settle an automobile liability suit when a considerable likelihood of an excess verdict existed. Id.
at 413. The Campbells asserted claims of bad faith, fraud, and intentional inﬂiction of emotional
distress. Id. at 414. At trial, the Campbells introduced evidence of the defendant’s unrelated
nationwide business practices, indicating alleged harm to nonparties. Id. at 415. The jury awarded
$2.6 million in compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages. Id. The trial court
judge reduced these to $1 million in compensatory damages and $25 million in punitive damages.
Id. The trial court based its award reduction on the large ratio between compensatory and punitive
damages. Id. Applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Gore, the Utah Supreme Court reinstated
the $145 million punitive damage award. Id.; Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d
1134 (Utah 2001). The United States Supreme Court granted review to reverse the reinstatement of
the $145 million punitive award by applying the Gore guideposts. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418.
62

Campbell, 538 U.S. at 417.

63

Id. at 423.

64

Id. The Utah Supreme Court supported its improper holding stating, “[e]ven if the harm
to the Campbells can be appropriately characterized as minimal, the trial court’s assessment of the
situation is on target: ‘The harm is minor to the individual but massive in the aggregate.’” Id.;
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1149 (Utah 1991).
65

State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 423 (2003).

66

Id. at 425. The following is an example of a single-digit ratio: a $1 million compensatory
damage award and a $9 million punitive damages award, arrived at by using a single-digit multiplier
of nine.
67
Id. “We decline again to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot
exceed. Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now established demonstrate, however, that, in
practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to
a signiﬁcant degree, will satisfy due process.” Id.
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Federal and Wyoming case law involving punitive damages also provide a
helpful framework for examining and understanding Phillip Morris. Under this
case law, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit used nonparty
harm to justify a large punitive damage award in a case with low compensatory
damages.68 Writing for the court, Judge Posner, in Mathias v. Accor Economy
Lodging, Inc. relied on nonparty harm, in part, to uphold the punitive damages
despite the large ratio between the compensatory and punitive damages award.69
Additionally, the court held that punitive damages in the case served to remove
the defendant’s potential proﬁts it derived from escaping detection.70

Punitive Damages in Wyoming
Several Wyoming cases have established standards for punitive damages.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has stated a jury may use a defendant’s wealth,
the injury’s nature and extent, the injurious act’s character, and aggravation in
determining punitive damages.71 Additionally, the Wyoming Supreme Court has
stated three factors juries should consider in punitive damage awards: nature of
the tort, actual damages, and the defendant’s wealth.72

68
Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003). In Mathias, the
court upheld a punitive damages award of $186,000 in a negligence action brought by two motel
guests for bedbug bites when the compensatory damages awarded in the case only totaled $5,000.
Id. at 673-74.
69

Id. at 678. Judge Posner stated, “[T]his is just the beginning. Other guests of the hotel
were endangered besides these two plaintiffs.” Id. The court emphasized the defendant’s outrageous
conduct including offering refunds only upon request, failing to fumigate, and deceiving ignorant
customers by alleging the bugs were ticks. Id. at 677.
70
Mathias, 347 F.3d at 677. (“The award of punitive damages in this case thus serves the
additional purpose of limiting the defendant’s ability to proﬁt from its fraud by escaping detection
and (private) prosecution. If a tortfeasor is ‘caught’ only half the time he commits torts, then when
he is caught he should be punished twice as heavily in order to make up for the time he gets away.”).
The proﬁt loss argument necessarily involves consideration of harm to nonparties. See id.
71

Hall Oil Co. v. Barquin, 237 P. 255, 278 (Wyo. 1925). In this trespass case involving entry
and drilling upon the plaintiff ’s land, the court found the defendant acted with a “reckless disregard
for, or a willful indifference to, the rights of the plaintiffs.” Id. at 271. The plaintiff requested
punitive damages in this trespass action. Id. at 257, 269.
72
Sears v. Summit, 616 P.2d 765, 772 (Wyo. 1980). Sears involved an incident of trespass
of a landowner upon trespassing party using heavy construction equipment. Id. at 766-69. The
landowner suffered damage from the trespass of the heavy equipment on his property. Id. at 76869. The landowner required the trespassing crew to leave their equipment on the property, while
being ushered off the property at gunpoint. Id. The court explained the defendant’s wealth was a
proper factor in calculating punitive damage awards, but required evidence in the record to support
an instruction based on this factor. Id. at 772. The court reversed and remanded on the issue of
punitive damages claims made by each party. Id. at 773-74.
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The Wyoming Supreme Court has more recently articulated an objective
standard it found comported with Gore, in Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Shirley.73
The court held juries must be given the seven criteria for determining punitive
damages: reasonable relationship between defendant’s conduct and the likely and
actual harm, degree of reprehensibility, removal of defendant’s proﬁt, defendant’s
wealth, costs of litigation, and mitigation for criminal and civil sanctions already
imposed.74
The previous United States Supreme Court, federal and Wyoming cases
provided the framework for a new limitation on punitive damages.75 While
courts discussed nonparty harm in earlier cases, the United States Supreme Court
directly addressed use of such harm when it set a new due process standard in
Philip Morris USA v. Williams for punitive damage awards.76

73
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Shirley, 958 P.2d 1040, 1043-44 (Wyo. 1998). In Shirley, an insurance
company appealed a jury verdict ﬁnding for the plaintiff motorist in a claim involving breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing in collecting underinsured motorist beneﬁts. Id. at 1042, 1045.
The court reversed and remanded the case, ordering a new trial. Id. at 1053.
74

Shirley, 958 P.2d at 1044 (citing Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223-24 (Ala.
1989)). The U.S. Supreme Court listed the factors:
(1) Punitive damages should bear a reasonable relationship to the harm that is likely to
occur from the defendant’s conduct as well as to the harm that actually occurred. If
the actual or likely harm is slight, the damages should be relatively small. If grievous,
the damages should be much greater.
(2) The degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct should be considered.
The duration of this conduct, the degree of the defendant’s awareness of any hazard
which his conduct has caused or is likely to cause, and any concealment or “coverup” of that hazard, and the existence and frequency of similar past conduct should
all be relevant in determining this degree of reprehensibility.
(3) If the wrongful conduct was proﬁtable to the defendant, the punitive damages
should remove the proﬁt and should be in excess of the proﬁt, so that the defendant
recognizes a loss.
(4) The ﬁnancial position of the defendant would be relevant.
(5) All the costs of litigation should be included, so as to encourage plaintiffs to bring
wrongdoers to trial.
(6) If criminal sanctions have been imposed on the defendant for his conduct, this
should be taken into account in mitigation of the punitive damages.
(7) If there have been other civil actions against the same defendant, based on the same
conduct, this should be taken into account in the mitigation of punitive damages
awards.
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1991). In Shirley, the Wyoming Supreme
Court not only acknowledged the guidelines endorsed by United States Supreme Court in Haslip,
but it mandated the guidelines be given to juries determining punitive damages in the form of jury
instructions. Shirley, 958 P.2d at 1053.
75

See supra notes 23-74 and accompanying text.

76

Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1065 (2007).
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PRINCIPAL CASE
Philip Morris USA v. Williams, the United States Supreme Court’s most recent
case involving punitive damages, evaluated the constitutionality of using alleged
nonparty harm in punitive damages calculations.77 Justice Breyer authored the
majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justices Kennedy, Souter, and
Alito.78 Justices Stevens, Thomas, and Ginsburg each wrote separate dissenting
opinions.79 Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia, however, each joined Justice
Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion as well.80

The Majority Opinion
In Philip Morris, the United States Supreme Court stated the purpose of punitive damages is to punish unlawful conduct and deter future unlawful conduct.81
However, the Court held states engaged in such punishment and deterrence must
provide defendants with fair notice of a penalty’s potential severity.82 Likewise,
the Court advised that without proper safeguards, a state, in its punitive damage
awards, could impose its policy choice on other states, which may have different
policies.83 Furthermore, the Court held the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause prohibits a state from using a punitive damage award to punish a
defendant for nonparty injuries.84 The Court based its holding on the view that
the Due Process Clause does not allow a state to punish a defendant without
offering that defendant the opportunity to present every defense possible.85 The
Court reasoned if a state allowed juries to consider nonparty harm in the damage
calculation, the state would effectively sanction the defendant for this alleged
harm without providing the defendant with the opportunity to defend such
allegations.86 Therefore, the Court held that juries may only use potential harm to
the plaintiff, not nonparties, in determining punitive damages.87
77

Id. at 1060.

78

Id.

79

Id.

80

Id. at 1062.

81

Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1062.

82

Id.

83

Id. A state imposes its policy preference on other states, if it punishes a defendant for harm to
alleged nonparty victims residing in other states. See id. (“[W]here the [punitive damages] amounts
are sufﬁciently large, it may impose one state’s (or one jury’s) ‘policy choice,’ say as to the conditions
under which (or even whether) certain products can be sold, upon ‘neighboring States’ with different
public policies.”). Id.
84

Id. at 1063.

85

Id.

86

Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063.

87

Id. The term “potential harm” reﬂects harm that could have been suffered by the plaintiff.

Id.
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The Court, however, stated that juries may use potential harm to nonparties
to show the defendant’s reprehensible conduct, which posed a risk to the general
public.88 The Court considered conduct risking harm to a large number of people
more reprehensible than conduct risking harm to only a small number of people.89
The Court drew an analogy between recidivism statutes and reprehensibility
determinations, stating that such statutes do not punish a criminal defendant
for additional past crimes, but make the penalty harsher for the current crime
based on the repetitive conduct.90 Juries, similarly, can consider nonparty harm
in punitive damages cases, not to punish the defendant for past or future harm,
but to determine the reprehensibility of his or her conduct with respect to the
plaintiff bringing the claim.91
The Oregon Supreme Court found the task of deciding whether a jury used
the reprehensibility determination to directly punish defendants for nonparty
injuries unworkable.92 The Phillip Morris Court responded by holding state
courts may not allow procedures that risk such confusion.93 The Court found a
high risk for confusion, and instructed courts to guard against misunderstanding
in the evidence presented and arguments made to the jury.94 The Court clariﬁed
that while states have some ﬂexibility in deciding the procedures they will
institute, they must offer some protection against confusion under this federal
constitutional standard.95 The Court remanded the case to the Oregon Supreme
Court.96 Because the case could face a new trial, the United States Supreme Court
declined to decide whether the award was grossly excessive.97

The Dissenting Opinions
In his dissent, Justice Stevens asserted that no identiﬁable reason existed why
nonparty harm cannot be considered in determining the appropriate punishment

88

Id. at 1064.

89

Id. at 1065.

90

Id.

91

Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1064.

92

Id.

93

Id. at 1065 (“State courts cannot authorize procedures that create an unreasonable and
unnecessary risk of any such confusion occurring.”).
94
Id. at 1064. Courts may prohibit counsel from making arguments suggesting harm to
parties may be multiplied by a number of known nonparties. Id. Courts may also allow evidence of
nonparty harm only for reprehensibility analysis. Id. at 1065. Courts may also choose to use explicit
jury instruction language that prohibits use of nonparty harm in the calculation of a punitive
damages award. Id.
95

Id. at 1065. The upcoming analysis section provides suggestions for such procedures for
practitioners and judges. See supra notes 150-168 and accompanying text.
96

Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1065.

97

Id.
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for reprehensible conduct.98 He identiﬁed the differences between punitive and
compensatory damages: punitive damages are a punishment for public harm the
defendant threatened or caused, and compensatory damages assess the harm the
defendant’s conduct caused the plaintiff.99
Looking at punitive damages from the perspective of a sanction for public
harm, Justice Stevens claimed little difference exists between the rationale for a
criminal sanction and a punitive damages award, and that both were historically
available in cases involving a private citizen.100 Unlike compensatory damages,
he asserted both punitive damages and criminal sanctions serve retribution and
deterrence purposes.101 Justice Stevens found no reason to exclude nonparty harm,
as a factor, in the punitive damage assessment for reprehensible conduct.102 He
endorsed a jury increasing a punitive damages award based on nonparty harm
to directly punish the defendant for that additional harm.103 He concluded the
plaintiff properly presented the jury with the evidence of possible harm to other
Oregon citizens.104
Justice Thomas’s brief dissenting opinion asserted the “Constitution does not
constrain the size of punitive damage awards.”105 He characterized the Court’s
holding as a confusing substantive, rather than procedural, change in due process
law.106 Justice Thomas further noted that no speciﬁc procedures were needed at
common law to constrain the jury’s power to award punitive damages.107
98

Id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

99

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

100

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83,
127-28 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring).
101
Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003)).
102

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

103

Id. at 1067 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“When a jury increases a punitive damages award
because injuries to third parties enhanced the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, the jury is
by deﬁnition punishing the defendant-directly-for third-party harm.”); Justice Stevens did not ﬁnd
use of criminal recidivism statutes helpful, “[b]ut if enhancing a penalty for a present crime because
of prior conduct that has already been punished is permissible, it is certainly proper to enhance a
penalty because the conduct before the court, which has never been punished, injured multiple
victims.” Id. n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104

See id. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

105

Id. at 1067 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,
538 U.S. 408, 429-30 (2003)).
106

Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1067 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

107

Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas cited Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in
Haslip: “In . . . 1868 punitive damages were undoubtedly an established part of the American
common law torts. It is . . . clear that no particular procedures were deemed necessary to circumscribe a jury’s discretion regarding the award of such damages, or their amount.” Id. at 1067-68
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring)).
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Justice Ginsburg authored the ﬁnal dissenting opinion, joined by Justices
Scalia and Thomas.108 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent reiterated the purpose of punitive
damages: to punish and not to compensate.109 The dissent asserted the Oregon
courts correctly applied the Court’s accepted reprehensibility inquiry under Gore
and Campbell.110
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent also asserted that Philip Morris only objected to
the trial court’s failure to present the defendant’s requested jury instruction,
charge number thirty-four, and that the Court did not address the trial court’s
denial of this instruction.111 The proposed instruction required the punitive
damages award exhibit a reasonable relationship to the plaintiff ’s harm.112 The
instruction would have theoretically allowed the jury to use nonparty harm to
determine reprehensibility, but prohibited similar consideration in assessing the
award amount.113 Justice Ginsburg asserted a trial court judge would not give
such a confusing instruction.114 By going beyond Philip Morris’s only preserved
objection, this dissent asserted the Court was overreaching in this case.115

108

Id. at 1068 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

109

Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

110

Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (supporting the Court’s deﬁnition of reprehensibility, “the
harm that Philip Morris was prepared to inﬂict on the smoking public at large”); State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429-50 (2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559, 599 (1996).
111

Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1068-69 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

112

Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

113

Id. at 1068-69 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The requested charge thirty-four read:
If you determine that some amount of punitive damages should be imposed on the
defendant, it will then be your task to set the amount that is appropriate. This should
be such amount as you believe is necessary to achieve the objectives of deterrence
and punishment. While there is not a set formula to be applied in reaching an
appropriate amount, I will now advise you of some of the factors that you may wish
to consider in this connection:
(1) The size of any punishment should bear a reasonable relationship to the harm
caused to Jesse Williams by the defendant’s punishable misconduct. Although
you may consider the extent of harm suffered by others in determining what that
reasonable relationship is, you are not to punish the defendant for the impact of its
alleged misconduct on other persons, who may bring lawsuits of their own in which
other juries can resolve their claims and award punitive damages for those harms, as
such other juries see ﬁt. . . .
(2) The size of the punishment may appropriately reﬂect the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct-that is, how far the defendant has departed from
accepted societal norms of conduct.

Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The charge indicates there are factors a jury may consider, but it
prohibits direct punishment based on nonparty harm when (and if ) the jury considers the reasonable
relationship. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
114

Id. at 1069 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

115

Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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ANALYSIS
This section discusses the mistake the Court made in creating a new due
process standard in light of the purposes of punitive damages.116 It further examines
the difﬁculty in using nonparty injuries solely to inform the reprehensibility
determination.117 This note subsequently provides practical guidance to courts
and practitioners to avoid due process violations under the new standard.118

The New and Confusing Due Process Standard
The Court made a grave mistake in attempting to fashion a compromise that
allows juries to use nonparty harm for limited purposes in cases involving punitive
damages.119 The objective of punitive damages is to punish, not to compensate.120
The Restatement (Second) of Torts states, that “[p]unitive damages may be awarded
for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his
reckless indifference to the rights of others.”121 As Justice Stevens wrote in his
dissent, “punitive damages are a sanction for the public harm the defendant’s
conduct has caused or threatened.”122 Justice Stevens compared such damages
to criminal sanctions, which historically have considered nonparty harm.123
The Court’s decision allows juries to look at nonparty harm to determine if the
defendant’s conduct posed a signiﬁcant risk to the general public in a reprehensibility
determination.124 Nevertheless, the information used in this reprehensibility
determination, may not be used in the punitive damages calculation to directly
punish the defendant.125
The United States Supreme Court previously held that a defendant’s
similar past conduct informs the reprehensibility evaluation.126 Gore gave three
guideposts for evaluating excessiveness of an award, the ﬁrst of which deter-

116

See infra notes 119-130 and accompanying text.

117

See infra notes 131-149 and accompanying text.

118

See infra notes 150-168 and accompanying text.

119

Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007); See Erwin Chemerinsky, More
Questions about Punitive Damages, Supreme Court Review, 43 TRIAL 72, 74 (May 2007) (“[O]ne
thing that is absolutely clear is that the ruling will engender enormous confusion in the lower
courts . . . .”).
120

Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1068 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

121

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 908(2) (1979).

122

Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

123

Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

124

Id. at1064.

125

Id.; Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive Damages as
Punishment for Individual Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583, 675 (2003).
126

Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21 (1991).
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mines reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.127 Gore asserted that evidence
of a defendant’s out-of-state conduct could be used in the reprehensibility
assessment.128 Because an evil motive or recklessness toward others is the basis for
punitive damages, the jury is well informed if it is presented with evidence of
recklessness toward nonparties.129 Nonetheless, juries can no longer use this harm
to punish the defendant directly.130
Difﬁculty inheres in asking a jury to use nonparty harm to assess reprehensibility, only to discard that determination in deciding the proper punishment.131
The Court commanded that a trial court must provide assurances that a jury
will “ask the right question, not the wrong one.”132 It charged trial courts with
guarding against confusion from evidence and arguments presented at trial.133
However, the Court appeared to soften this new standard when it asserted that
state courts will have ﬂexibility in implementing this protection.134 Nevertheless,
such ﬂexibility may result in an increased threat of appellate review rather than a
clear due process standard.135 The important ﬂexibility touted by the Court fails
to clarify how a jury can disregard nonparty harm when it calculates punitive
damages after using such harm in its reprehensibility determination.136

127

BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996).

128

Id. at 574 n.21.

129

See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1067 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“[T]here is no reason why the measure of the appropriate punishment for engaging in a campaign of
deceit in distributing a poisonous and addictive substance to thousands cigarette smokers statewide
should not include consideration of the harm to those ‘bystanders’ as well as harm to the individual
plaintiff.”).
130

Id. at 1064.

131

Daniel Susler Agle, Working the Unworkable Rule Established in Philip Morris: Acknowledging
the Difference Between Actual and Potential Injury to Nonparties, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1317, 1355
(2007) (“If jurors consider injury to nonparties when determining reprehensibility, and if, at the
same time, they consider reprehensibility to determine the amount of punitive damages to assess,
naturally jurors ultimately will consider injury to nonparties when determining the total punitive
damages.”).
132

Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1064.

133

Id. at 1065.

134

Id. at 1065.

135

Id. at 1068 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing the Court’s decision is evidence that the
“Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence is ‘insusceptible of principled application’”) (quoting
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 563 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see Farmers Ins.
Exch. v. Shirley, 958 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Wyo. 1998). The Wyoming Supreme Court reasoned that
without objective standards for calculating punitive damages “we hazard litigants in our courts to
future reversal by the Supreme Court of the United States because of the denial of due process of
law resulting from the application of our current process.” Id. at 1045. See also Michael I. Krauss,
Punitive Damages and the Supreme Court: A Tragedy in Five Acts, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 315, 334
(2007) (“We can look forward to years of litigation and circuit splits trying to sort out what the
Court hath wrought.”).
136

See Agle, supra note 131, at 1355.
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In spite of the Court’s ruling, juries may use nonparty harm from the
reprehensibility analysis in calculating punitive damage awards.137 Also, the new
prohibition in calculation may lead juries to obscure the reasoning behind award
calculation.138 If juries act accordingly, the awards generally may decrease or even
increase.139
The jury in one United States Court of Appeals case, without guidance,
multiplied the plaintiff ’s harm by the number of alleged nonparties injured to
reach a punitive award.140 Despite insigniﬁcant compensatory harm suffered by
the plaintiff, the court upheld the punitive damage award based on signiﬁcant
nonparty harm.141 The Philip Morris Court rejected the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning
stating, “it is appropriate to consider the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award in light of potential harm the defendant’s conduct could have caused. But
we have made clear that the potential harm at issue was harm potentially caused
the plaintiff.”142 When a jury now engages in punitive damages calculation, it
may not use alleged numbers of potentially affected nonparties in any way.143
Juries may still be inclined to use numbers of nonparty harm in punitive damage
calculations, even though counsel or courts attempt to comply with the new
due process standard.144 Additionally, without the restraint of a number, such as
alleged nonparty injuries, juries may award even higher, more arbitrary awards.145
Or, juries may also use nonparty harm in calculations, but hide this fact from
courts and parties.146 In Mathias, Judge Posner explained that because no punitive
137

See Jeff Bleich, Michelle Friedland, Dan Powell, & Aimee Feinberg, Smoke Signals, 67-Jun.
OR. ST. B. BULL. 24, 29 (June 2007) (“[W]hile juries cannot directly count harm to non-litigants,
they could continue to impose, under the mantle of reprehensibility, hefty damages judgments on
defendants whose conduct affects many people.”) (emphasis added).
138

Id.

139

See Ben Figa, Note, The New Due Process Limitation in Philip Morris: A Critique and
an Alternative Rule Based on Prior Adjudication, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 179, 190 (2007) (“[J]ury
instructions that are in accordance with Philip Morris may confuse the jury and lead to erroneous
verdicts.”).
140
Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003). In Mathias,
there were no damage guidelines, but nonetheless, the jury awarded a punitive damages award that,
combined with the compensatory award, neatly equaled a $1,000 penalty for each hotel room. Id.
at 678.
141

Id. at 677.

142

Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007).

143

Id. at 1065. See supra note 131 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difﬁculty
juries will face with limiting instructions.
144

See Chemerinsky, supra note 119, at 74 (noting the distinction between reprehensibility
determination and punishment may be clear to the Court, but it may be too confusing for juries to
understand and administer). The number the jury may have used in Mathias is the number of rooms
in the hotel, arguably a proxy number of third party victims. See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Economy
Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2003); see supra note 140 for a facts of Mathias.
145

Mathias, 347 F.3d at 678; Chemerinksy, supra note 119, at 74.

146

See, e.g., Mathias, 347 F.3d at 678.
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damages guidelines exist, similar to criminal federal and state sentencing guidelines, the amounts of punitive damage awards will be arbitrary.147
Commentators suggest the Court is now moving beyond just limiting
punitive damage awards, and moving toward questioning the purpose of punitive
damage awards generally.148 However, the Court only took a step in that direction
in Philip Morris when it set a new standard that courts of all states, including
Wyoming, must implement.149

Application to Wyoming
While Wyoming is not bound by statutory limits governing punitive damages,
Wyoming, like all states, must now provide assurances that juries do not violate
the Due Process Clause by punishing defendants for nonparty harm.150 The
Wyoming Supreme Court required courts to deliver objective jury instruction
standards in Shirley.151 Adhering to Gore, the Wyoming court sought to give juries
more speciﬁc factors when awarding punitive damages.152 The jury instruction
proposed below alters the instructions given by the Wyoming Supreme Court in
Shirley in light of Philip Morris.153
In Wyoming, mandatory bifurcation of the determination of whether
punitive damages should be awarded from the punitive damage calculation
occurs at trial.154 This mandatory bifurcation may help Wyoming juries to draw
the confusing, yet required, line between the reprehensibility analysis and the
damage award calculation.155 Bifurcating the trial for punitive damages mandates
that juries assess punitive damages in two parts, ﬁrst assessment of liability and
whether the plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages and second, calculation of
147
Id. (“[I]t is inevitable that the speciﬁc amount of punitive damages awarded whether by
judge or jury will be arbitrary.”).
148

Bleich, Friedland, Powell, & Feinberg, supra note 137, at 24.

149

Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1064 (2007).

150

Id.

151

Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Shirley, 958 P.2d 1040, 1043-44 (Wyo. 1998);

152

Id. at 1052. The Court adopted the factors from Green Oil, approved in Haslip. See also
supra notes 37 and 74 and accompanying text for an examination of the factors.
153

See infra note 160 and accompanying text for the proposed jury instruction.

154

Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121, 1132 (Wyo. 1981).

155

Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1064 (2007). See Wyoming Civil Pattern
Jury Instructions 4.06, Exemplary or Punitive Damages—Phase I of Bifurcated Trial, and 4.06A,
Exemplary or Punitive Damages—Phase II of Bifurcated Trial (2003) (showing bifurcated trial
procedure currently used to determine liability for punitive damages before the award calculation).
But see Elizabeth A. Davis, Providing Greater Integrity for Punitive Awards, 2 OHIO TORT L. J. 91,
91 (2007) (“[B]ecause the guideposts [for determining reprehensibility and punitive damages
calculations] are interrelated and require balancing, it is difﬁcult to see how a court could separate
the presentation of evidence so that a jury could determine each post.”).
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the punitive award.156 Courts must take steps, as required by Philip Morris, to
guard against due process violation.157

Guidance for Courts
Trial courts now have an obligation to bar jury instructions that allow
consideration of nonparty harm in punitive damages calculation.158 This
obligation extends to preventing counsel from presenting opening statements,
closing arguments, or evidence that will allow jurors to use nonparty harm
for more than reprehensibility determinations.159 In light of Philip Morris, a suggested jury instruction for the calculation of punitive damages is provided
below:
In calculating the punitive damage award you should consider
the following:
1) The award should bear a reasonable relationship to the
potential or actual harm suffered by the plaintiff.
2) Reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct—You may
consider harm to nonparties in determining the reprehensibility
of the defendant’s conduct, but you may not use this harm
to punish the defendant directly. You may not multiply the
defendant’s harm by the number of other alleged victims not
party to this lawsuit who may bring suits of their own and
receive their own punitive damage awards.
3) If the wrongful conduct was proﬁtable for the defendant,
the damages should remove only the proﬁt derived from the
individual plaintiff ’s harm.
4) You may consider the ﬁnancial position of the defendant.
5) The costs of litigation should be considered to encourage
the plaintiffs to litigate such cases.
6) If criminal sanctions have been imposed, the award should
be reduced to take into account such sanctions.160

156

Campen, 635 P.2d at 1132; Davis, supra note 155, at 91.

157

Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1064 (2007).

158

Id.

159

Id. at 1065; J. David Prince & Paula Duggan Vraa, Focusing the Penalty: New Limits on
Punitive Damages, 64-APR BENCH & B. MINN. 24, 28 (2007).
160

Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1064. The instructions were adapted from the Wyoming Civil
Pattern Jury Instructions 4.06A (2003). Section seven of the pattern instruction is now obsolete,
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In guarding against now-prohibited arguments and evidence presented by
counsel, such a jury instruction will enable the State to provide due process
assurances to defendants facing punitive damages.161 Additionally, the new due
process standard prohibits juries from removing proﬁts gained by the defendant
for any conduct beyond that which directly harmed the plaintiffs in punitive
damage calculation.162 Therefore, the proposed instruction only modiﬁes the
previous standards set by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Shirley.163

Guidance for Practitioners
While the line between using nonparty harm in determining reprehensibility
and punishing directly may not be clear, practitioners must attempt to make
this distinction.164 The Due Process Clause prohibits a state from using punitive
damages to punish a defendant without giving that defendant the opportunity
to raise every possible defense.165 Counsel must be aware of this danger when
presenting reprehensibility arguments and evidence.166 Counsel may need to

because in the absence of other pending civil actions against the defendant, consideration of
nonparty harm is still a due process violation according to Philip Morris. This instruction comports
with Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Shirley, 958 P.2d 1040, 1043-44 (Wyo. 1998).
161
Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1064-65; see Colby, supra note 125, at 674-75 (arguing that
such a change comporting with due process requires recognition that the purpose of punitive
damages is not punishment for a public wrong, but punishment for a private wrong, the injury to
the plaintiff ); see also Prince & Vraa, supra note 159, at 28 (“[T]he protections . . . may include . . .
strongly worded jury instructions, more explicit special verdict forms, or even special admonitions
to the jury.”).
162
See Colby, supra note 125, at 675-76. Colby argues that courts should not instruct juries to
take away the defendant’s proﬁts for an “entire course” of conduct, only the proﬁt earned associated
with the parties injured. Id.
163

Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Shirley, 958 P.2d 1040, 1043-44 (Wyo. 1998).

164

Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1065 (2007). See Chemerinsky, supra
note 119, at 74 (“[The jury] can be told that it can consider harm to nonparties in assessing the
reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct and that reprehensibility is the most important factor in
determining the size of the punitive damages award. But the jury also must be told that it cannot
punish the defendant for harm to nonparties.”); Colby, supra note 125, at 675-76 (The jury should
be instructed that it may consider the harm to other victims only for the purpose of ascertaining the
degree of reprehensibility of the wrong to the plaintiff, but it may not punish the defendant for the
wrong done, or the harm caused, to persons not before the court; nor should it endeavor to remove
the proﬁts illicitly gained at the expense of victims not before the court.); Agle, supra note 131, at
1319; Prince & Vraa, supra note 159, at 28 (noting Philip Morris may place most of the burden on
the defendant to request appropriate protections).
165
Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1063 (holding defendant should be allowed to defend claims of
alleged nonparty harms, either by joining nonparties or excluding such allegations from consideration
in punitive damage calculation). Colby, supra note 125, at 675.
166

See Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1065; (holding a court, upon request, must protect against
the introduction of certain evidence and the presentation of arguments that risk due process
violation); see Colby, supra note 125, at 675.
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request that a limiting jury instruction accompany evidence of nonparty harm,
prohibiting its use in punitive damages calculation.167 The line between assessing
reprehensibility and directly punishing is a line practitioners must attempt to
draw to avoid constitutional due process violations.168

CONCLUSION
The Philip Morris Court’s distinction between using nonparty harm to punish
directly and to assess reprehensibility sets a confusing and difﬁcult standard for
states to implement; a mistake by the Philip Morris Court. However, practitioners
and courts must try to identify the distinction to avoid violating the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause. In Wyoming, juries should receive speciﬁc
jury instructions similar to the proposal set forth in this case note. Courts must
also guard against statements made by counsel and evidence introduced, and if
needed, qualify its purpose solely for reprehensibility analysis. Practitioners also
must heed the new standard in presenting arguments, introducing evidence,
requesting limiting instructions, and proposing jury instructions.

167
Colby, supra note 125, at 675; Prince & Vraa, supra note 159, at 28 (“[W]hile the decision
charges the state courts to ensure appropriate protections are used, it also appears to put most of
the burden on the defendant to request such appropriate protections.”); Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct.
at 1065 (holding that when confusion between the use of nonparty harm for reprehensibility and
damage calculation of the award is great, “a court, upon request, must protect against that risk.”)
(emphasis added).
168
Philip Morris, 127 S. Ct. at 1064 (holding risk of failure to make a distinction between
using nonparty harm for reprehensibility determination and punishing directly must be guarded
against in plaintiff ’s arguments and evidence presented at trial); see Colby, supra note 125, at 675-76
(asserting juries should be instructed to base punitive awards solely based on harm suffered by
plaintiffs).
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